The Contribution of Somali Diaspora in Denmark to Peacebuilding in Somalia through Multi-Track Diplomacy

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Abstract: The paper assesses the ways the Somali diaspora in Denmark is contributing to peacebuilding in their home country through what is known in peace studies as Multi-Track Diplomacy. It starts by defining the concepts of peacebuilding and Multi-track Diplomacy, showing how the latter works as an instrument for the former. The paper then describes and analyzes how, through a varied array of activities that include all tracks of diplomacy as classified by the Diamond&McDonald model, members of Danish diaspora function as interface agents between their home and host societies helping to build the conditions for a stable peace. The article also analyzes how the diplomacy tracks carried out by the Somali-Danish diaspora, as well as the extent of their reach, are shaped by the particular characteristics of this group vis-à-vis other Somali diasporic communities: namely, its small size and relatively high levels of integration and acculturation into the Danish host society.

Keywords: Danish-Somalis, multi-track diplomacy, peacebuilding, Somalia, Somali diaspora.

The Concepts of Peacebuilding and Multi-track Diplomacy

Introduced for the first time by Galtung (1975), peacebuilding progressively became a mainstream concept in the field of peace studies (Heap, 1983; Young, 1987). The document an Agenda for Peace by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) can be considered its official come-of-age. Since then, it has been further developed by many others (Haugerudbraaten, 1998; Karlsrud, 2019; Ryan, 2013). Peacebuilding refers to a multidimensional and long-term set of activities carried out by a wide range of stakeholders (from government to civil society) and aimed at addressing the underlying causes of violence. Those activities involve, among others, promoting understanding and fostering constructive personal, group, and political relationships across the opposing ethnic, religious, class, national, or racial divides and building strong and fair legal, political, economic and social institutions. Peacebuilding is, therefore, a continuous protracted process that does not end with the restoration of normal relations between former enemies but lasts for as long as it takes until a given society is equipped with what it needs to prevent any slipping back into conflict. In this sense, the concept makes a distinction between negative peace (the mere absence of direct violence) and positive peace (the absence of any indirect form of structural and cultural violence). In pursuing that goal all social actors can become peacebuilding agents. Peacebuilding is, thus, a collective effort where any contribution matters and none is negligible.

The other key concept in this paper, Multi-track Diplomacy, developed independently

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but was later integrated into that of peacebuilding, as it is considered to be one of the mechanisms by which the peacebuilding process is achieved. Davidson & Monville (1981) first drew attention to the fact that there are many actors and activities outside the official diplomatic channels that also perform related functions and coined the term Track II Diplomacy to refer to them. Diamond & McDonald (1991) later expanded the tracks to a total of four, arguing that the Track II category lumped together actors of very different nature. They would eventually refine their model to come up with nine different kinds of diplomatic agents and activities (Diamond & McDonald, 1996). Till date, this model has been applied by a great number of researchers (Hrynkow, 2018; Lehti, 2019; Price & Price, 2004; Wehrenfenning, 2008).

The nine forms of diplomacy identified by Diamond and McDonald are vital for peacebuilding because the official, formal tools of diplomacy have proven, crisis after crisis, to be insufficient to handle the overwhelming challenges posed by very complex, multiparty political conflicts (Winckler, 2015). This has been particularly the case in the intractable Somali conflict where less visible actors and forces simultaneously acting on the backstage have been at least as important for the relative stabilization of the country as the state-sponsored peacebuilding actions.

Objectives

As a general objective, this paper aims at analyzing a varied array of activities carried out by individuals and groups from the Danish-Somali diaspora as forms of Multi-track Diplomacy, following Diamond & McDonald’s nine-track model. In doing so, it will try to answer the following question: in which ways the particular characteristics of Danish-Somalis differentially condition and shape their peacebuilding actions? Danish-Somali diaspora groups have not been impervious to their host societies but have interacted with them, undergoing processes of social and cultural change that have made them progressively diverge from other Somali diaspora groups. The paper will show how these processes add up to initial differences amongst Somali diasporic groups shaping the way Danish-Somali act as peacebuilding agents. Finally, the paper will also analyze the differences in the way first and second generations engage in Multi-track diplomacy activities.

Methodology

Research was conducted between 2015 and 2016 among the Somali community of Aarhus. The choice of the city was methodologically based on two grounds: a) most of the then existing ethnographic studies on the Danish-Somalis were concentrated on those from the Copenhagen area (Hussain, 2014; Valentine et al., 2009) b) by studying the less known Somali community from Aarhus (the second largest in Denmark) while using the previous works as complementary material, we aimed at enlarging the reach of our data and analysis. Additionally, some interviews were also made in the nearby town of Randers.

A first 3 months period involved the collection of bibliography, a literature review, the first contacts with Somali organizations, the elaboration of a list of informants and the conducting of exploratory interviews. Our point of entry were the migrants’ associations. Their cadres and volunteers would then lead us to other informants through snowball sampling (Beauchemin & González-Ferrer, 2011). We tried to get a balanced representation of male and female, first and second generation, as well as leaders/active members of associations and the rest of the population. Fieldwork was conducted during a second six months period through a mix of qualitative techniques; participant observation in the associations and with some selected families, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, life histories and discussion groups. In total, 80 individuals were interviewed and 4 discussion groups conducted until reaching data saturation. Considering the ongoing conflict in Somalia, a policy of strict anonymity with
regards to informants has been followed. The fact that one of the authors is an English-Speaking Cameroonian helped strengthen rapport with the interviewees in general and, specifically, with those from English-speaking Somaliland. In spite of this, the ethnographic research bumped into a series of limitations: 1) As many informants were not fluent in English, communication often took place through volunteer translating, which always involves the possibility of weakening the rapport and misinterpreting some information. 2) Some informants showed reluctance to give detailed accounts about matters related to the war, whether for political or personal reasons (not wishing to recall particularly hard experiences) 3) communication was less fluent with female informants of more advanced age, maybe due to traditional gender barriers in Somali culture. Data collected through this array of ethnographic methods was codified and analyzed with the help of Atlas.ti software.

The Somali Conflict and The Somali Diaspora in Denmark

Somalia, for decades the epitome of “intractable conflict” (Coleman, 2003), has made significant progress towards peace. Although the fight against jihadism (Al Shabaab and ISIS) is far from over, the 2011 agreement among most of the non-jihadi factions led to the creation of a stable federal administration that has managed to defuse the bomb of interclan feuds and regional separatism. 2017 witnessed the first peaceful power transition in the recent history of the Somali state (Chevreau, 2019). Only Somaliland refused to fully integrate in the new federal Somalia but it has managed to achieve a relatively stable coexistence with Mogadishu and to build a reasonably functioning democracy where jihadism has no foothold (Richards, 2020).

Since 2012 the government has implemented legal, security and institutional mechanisms to consolidate the country’s stability (United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 2015). There is an increasing flow of returnees (United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees [UNHCR], 2019) and the economy has featured a steady growth along the last decade (World Bank, 2020). There is abundant evidence of the key role played by diaspora in these developments (Abshir, 2019; Bastuh, 2020; Elmi 2019; Galipo, 2018).

Somalia has a population of around 11 million and its diaspora has been estimated in between 1 and 1.5 million (Osman, 2020). The Scandinavian diaspora is the third largest one after those in neighboring (Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates) and Western English-speaking countries (USA, Britain, Canada). Danish-Somalis amount to between 1% and 1,5% of the total diaspora, being the smallest community amongst Scandinavian countries (the Swedish one, 70,173, is the biggest (Statistics Sweden, 2019)). As of 2020 there were 21,046 persons of Somali origin in Denmark of whom 55% had been born in Somalia. Of these, 4,828 lived in Aarhus (Statistics Denmark, 2020). These figures testify of a small community with a large second generation. The size of the Danish-Somali community is likely one of the reasons why it has so far been relatively neglected by researchers. It leads us to hypothesize that its weight in peacebuilding may also be small compared with that of other groups but by no means it implies that the subject is not worth studying. Research on minority phenomena not only has always a value in itself but it can also be a useful tool to help us understand more mainstream ones.

Danish Somalis show characteristics similar to those in the rest of Scandinavia (Horst, 2018; Scuzzarello & Carlson, 2019) which differ, in turn, from diasporas in Anglosaxon countries (Abdulle, 2018; Chambers, 2017; Liberatore, 2018). One of them is their higher level of acculturation. This is particularly the case of those grown-up or born in Denmark, but to a certain extent is also true of the first generation, who have spent most of their adults’ lives abroad. This is partially a consequence of the State implementing a middle way between assimilationist and multiculturalist policies (Hellstrom & Tawat, 2020; Mouritsen & Olsen, 2013) trying to respect cultural differences while creating a common set of values between the
native and migrant populations. All newly arrived refugees over 18 must take part in a compulsory three-year “integration programme” which includes learning Danish and the civic values embodied in Danish institutions. At the same time, the government provides free teaching in the immigrants’ mother-tongue (Hussain, 2014). Many Somali in Aarhus speak Danish at home in contrast with Somalis in the UK (Abdulle, 2018; Valentine et al., 2009). Some of the young people declared to speak Danish better than Somali and not even having any “ethnic” accent. Somalis in Denmark have below-average incomes and education levels and above-average unemployment rates (Statistics Denmark, 2020) and this situation may have, within the framework of the Danish Welfare State, paradoxically driven them to assimilate more than diasporas in other countries. As opposed to North America and the UK, where diaspora had to resort to the market for accommodation, which resulted in their ghettoization, 80% percent of Danish-Somali live in public housing. This allowed the government to design a policy aimed to avoid the creation of big communities, which have shown a tendency to be culturally secluded. Somalis have been given accommodation amongst Danish and other asylum seekers. Children are often the only Somalis in their class, which increases the peer pressure to conform to Danish culture (Hussain, 2014).

All interviewees declare to be very proud of the civic values embodied by the Danish state. Most of them practice a progressive version of Islam. In places with larger Somali diasporas, which form part of even larger Muslim communities, identities and practices have remained more traditional, because people, especially youngsters, experience strong social pressure to practice their faith in order to maintain their family's reputation (Valentine et al., 2009). In Denmark, the more atomized Somalis adopted an individualistic style of parenting, allowing their children more freedom to define what it means to be Muslim. Even though interviewees from all generations self-identified as Muslims, many rarely attend the mosque. Although most women still wear a hijab, they dress in Western style, reject most of the traditional gender roles and abhor practices like genital mutilation. Our findings are consistent with those of Valentine et al. (2009) who pointed out how Scandinavian Somalis who moved to Sheffield were regarded as not being ‘proper’ Muslims by the local community.

Another general trait of Scandinavian-Somalis is that they are a quite socially homogenous group. There are very few people coming from the Somali elites. The elites massively chose to flee to the former metropolises (Italy and Britain) and North America (Chambers, 2017; Gonnelli, 2018, Liberatore, 2018). Many had previously studied and lived there, had political and personal connections, spoke the language and partially shared the culture. They thought they would thrive more easily there, and they weren’t the only ones: That is why diaspora groups are much larger in those countries. Big numbers, initial proficiency in the language and a more pro-entrepreneurship local culture allowed the emergence of a significant group of successful new professionals and businessmen within the North American diaspora (some of them running enterprises that provided services for the diaspora community itself). In contrast, the majority of the Scandinavian diaspora came from lower and lower-middle class backgrounds (as a proof of this, a significant part of them didn’t speak English). The strong social democratic stance of Danish society has successfully kept them out of extreme poverty but has not resulted in fast social mobility. Particularly, it has not encouraged an entrepreneurship spirit in the way North American society did. The Scandinavian Welfare States also shaped Somali social structures in another way: by providing the basic necessities at the individual level even before promoting integration in the labor market, especially for women, they contributed to reduce dependence on the clan, helping to dissolve the clan cohesion and the hierarchical patriarchal structures. These structures are much weaker among the Scandinavian diaspora that among those in other countries, particularly the African and Gulf Arab states - but also the US to a certain extent- where the absence (or weaker reach) of welfare systems led exiles to rely on clan solidarity to survive, contributing to the continuation of the clan’s socio-economic function and, therefore, its structural gender-unbalanced power over the
individuals (Farah, 2020). We collected conclusive evidence that clan identity among the Danish-Somali is increasingly being substituted by a Pan-Somali or even a cosmopolitan Pan-Muslim one.

At the same time, Somali parents have been very keen in transmitting their offspring a sense of belonging to the motherland. We concur with Valentine et al.’s (2009) in that this has been a selective process by which parents have consciously tried to filter out the negative memories, portraying a mostly positive, emotional but romanticized image of Somalia. The result is a very complex identity. Danish-Somali show an attachment to both societies and feel, at the same time, not fully accepted by any of them. This is something they experience on a daily basis because, in spite of their commitment to Danish civic values, they are constantly “othered”. As a matter of fact, Danish integration policies were, in part, aimed at counteracting a surge of Islamophobic feelings which erupted after 9/11 (Wren, 2001). In spite of the positive response of most Somalis to these policies Danish-Somalis still are at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy in their neighborhoods (Bundgaard, 2018) and informants report discrimination episodes experienced in the educational system and labor market. On the other hand, those who return to Somalia suffer from another form of “othering”. Native Somalis sometimes frown their secularized and westernized behavior upon. These positions are illustrated in the following testimonies:

We work side by side with the Danes, we live in the same neighborhoods. We understand each other, we belong to the same society, send our children to the same schools, and we speak the language but culturally we cannot agree (male, 35).

When I went to Somalia I felt like a foreigner. People stared at me because of the way I dressed, the way I talked, the way I moved. And they gossip about you. You are conspicuous all the time. Although we are working class in Aarhus, people see you as rich and sometimes it is very upsetting. So, after a while I ended up hanging out with other people from the diaspora who were experiencing the same situation (female, 22).

Danish-Somali can be seen as an in-between group that is genuinely distinct from the host and original ones while at the same time socially and emotionally linked to them. It is a new culture where elements of Western and African origin combine in a way that makes them compatible and meaningful within a moral framework provided by the principles of moderate Islam and the Scandinavian social-democratic State (Bond, 2019). As it happens in many diasporic communities (Román-Velázquez & Retis, 2021) this hybrid identity manifests itself in the form of a continuum, with most people being located in intermediate positions between the poles of Somali traditional culture (and in rare cases forms of radical Islamism) in one hand, and total assimilation to Danish culture in the other. Those grown up in Somalia are usually closer to the Somali pole (they still keep, among other things, an attachment to their clan and Somali as first language) whereas the opposite is the case for the second generation.

The Somali Diaspora in Denmark: Assessing its Contribution to Peacebuilding through Multi-Track Diplomacy

Track 1: Peacebuilding through Official Diplomacy and Policy-Making
For many years exiles’ priorities were getting asylum and securing a decent living in their host countries, not engaging in policy-making at home (Abdile, 2010). This situation progressively changed as more and more exiles returned, armed with newly acquired economic and professional resources. Some of them came back as entrepreneurs, some as skilled administrators and some used those resources as political leverage to get themselves a seat at the peace table and the new administration. 38% of the federal congressmen come from the diaspora (Marchal, 2017). Many members of the cabinet, starting with the President, are returnees, although only the Prime Minister hails from the Scandinavian (Norwegian) diaspora (Chevreau, 2019). We haven’t been able to find out Danish-Somalis in the current administration. This seems quite unlikely, though, because, had that been the case, informants would have probably known. The reason lies in the demographic and social characteristics of the Danish diaspora itself. Although there are some notable cases of rags-to-riches stories, most returnee politicians hail from previous elite families within the dominant subclans, that is from the Italian or Anglo-Saxon diasporas (Galipo, 2018; Menkhaus, 2018).

This absence in Somali politics contrasts with the relevant diplomatic activity displayed by the Danish government. Being one the oldest asylum-seekers groups in Denmark, Somalia has always been a priority country for Danish diplomacy. DANIDA, the cooperation for development body, runs the Peace and Stabilization Program for the Horn of Africa (PSPHA) (Damstrøm et al., 2015) and is a partner in the Somaliland Business Fund, the Somalia Resilience and the Building Resilience in Central Somalia programs, all of them focused in building community resilience (a peacebuilding activity). Other DANIDA-funded programs are run by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), one of the NGOs with the largest presence in Somalia, and include issues such as gender-based and armed violence reduction, food security, shelter or demining (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs [DMFA], 2015).

DANIDA also finances two programs aimed at diaspora organizations in Denmark: DiaGram, whose goal is to establish transnational networks of diaspora organizations to share experiences and best practices, and Diaspora Project Support, which encourages diaspora organizations to become agents of change in their home countries. Only Somali and Afghan organizations are entitled to this program, a proof of the privileged status enjoyed by the Somali diaspora vis-à-vis the Danish state (DMFA, 2015).

Surprisingly though, and as opposed to what happens in other Scandinavian countries, such as Norway, whose major NGOs working in Somalia are or were at some point headed by members of the diaspora (Tellander & Horst, 2019), Danish-Somalis are absent from DANIDA managerial positions (the country director is a Kenyan). Why this is so we have not been able to ascertain. Does it reflect the lack of skilled professionals amongst the diaspora in Denmark? Is it due to a lack of trust in the neutrality of Danish-Somalis?

**Track 2: Peacebuilding Through Non-Governmental Conflict Resolution**

This role is currently fulfilled by the PSPHA through a network of local partner NGOs and two lines of action: 1) awareness-raising mechanisms that address key fault lines within and between the different levels of government, bolster people’s confidence in the authorities and help build more inclusive and accountable ways of governance. 2) rehabilitation and reintegration programs for al-Shabaab defectors (DMFA, 2018).

Other Scandinavian governments have also been very active in the promotion of conflict resolution, reflecting their deep-rooted commitment for peace. A significant example is the Finnish Peace Initiative Program (PIP) (Abdile, 2014). Since 2007 the PIP has been acting as a mediator on several inter-clan conflicts, through workshops which brought together the leaders of the warring parties. The role of diaspora members in PIP is crucial, both as mediators between Finnish managers and clan leaders and between the Somali conflicting parties. This role is almost exclusively fulfilled by first generation individuals. Having themselves lost loved
ones or undergone personal tragedies during the war gives them the moral authority to speak against it.

It is possible that there are members of the Danish diaspora working for the PSPHA or the PIP, although we haven’t been able to find any.

**Track 3: Peacebuilding through Remittances, Investment and Trade**

The total flow of remittances is estimated at 1.5 billion dollars per year, one third of Somalia’s GDP. 40% of Somalis rely on them to make a living (Majid et al., 2017). They make up about 80% of the start-up capital for small and medium enterprises (Benson et al. 2015; Bulut & Mohamed, 2018). Diaspora investment, on the other hand, has been steadily pouring into retail, transportation, fisheries, airlines, telecommunications, and residential and hotel construction (Abshir, 2019). This cash flow has prevented the circle of violence from becoming more vicious by taking a significant part of the population out of misery, keeping individuals busy with jobs and business projects, and making them less dependent on resources controlled and doled out by the militias that still act as the *de facto* administration in many parts of the country and whose aid usually comes at the price of collaboration.

Danish-Somalis remit around 45 million dollars per year (Damstrøm et al., 2015). 200-300 dollars per household/month on average, with some sending up to 1000. These figures bear witness to a high level of commitment, considering Danish-Somalis have below-average salaries and 26% of them are unemployed. The amount per capita is higher - when compared to their disposable income- than those reported for other Somali diasporas (Bulut & Mohamed, 2018; Majid et al., 2017).

First generation individuals show a stronger sense of solidarity towards the extended family and clan and in some cases have used remittances as peacebuilding tools in a traditional way: as *diya* (blood payment) to settle disputes between the sender’s subclan and a rival one. Remittances driven by group solidarity, on the other hand, sometimes have a negative impact on peacebuilding, as money is used for arming clan (Majid et al., 2017) or jihadi militias (Sipus, 2011).

Those moral obligations are much weaker in the second generation. Although they still retain a relatively strong Somali identity this is a more abstract, intellectually constructed one, based on the differential faith *vis-à-vis* the Danish population and a general sense of belonging more akin to a modern national identity than a clan-based one. Second generation informants tend to show higher degrees of individualistic behavior and life expectations similar to the native Danish. As a consequence, many resent the idea of being indefinitely obliged to send money to Somalia, and they even look at it as a sort of negative loop that promotes laziness and dependency.

*I sometimes believe we are not doing the right thing in the long term to help these people. They have gotten used to not trying to do anything enterprising, because they know that we will send them money regularly* (male, 31).

Some second-generation Danish-Somalis see remittances as conflicting with their own wellbeing. Some of them complained that they felt they were “stealing that money from their own children” and were “afraid to not be able to save enough for their mortgage or retirement”. They also stated that pressure had risen in the last decade, as the Internet has become more affordable and widespread in Somalia. Now, distant relatives or clan members contact them on social media invoking kinship solidarity and some experience this as a form of harassment. A similar feeling has been reported by young Danish-Somalis who make visit trips to their
People believe that, because we come from Europe, we are all rich or have influence and ask for money or help to get a visa or many other things all the time. And it is quite upsetting, or maybe makes me laugh, because we barely scratch a living back in Aarhus, where everybody sees us as the poor ones. (female, 25)

These symptoms of donor fatigue were already detected by other studies. Hammond et al. (2011) even warned remittances might decline in the future. For the time being this has not been the case but as the second generation progressively becomes the main money sender the remittances pattern is changing: cash flows tend to concentrate on close relatives and donations to clan elders to disappear. When younger diaspora members donate outside the close family they tend to fund non-clan-based NGOs and development projects, with overall positive effects for the peacebuilding process. Similar trends have been found among Swedish-Somalis (Rosendal, 2019).

**Track 4: Peacebuilding through Personal Involvement in NGOs**

Danish-Somalis approach DANIDA more often than other groups in search of support to found NGOs to carry out humanitarian projects in Somalia (Danstrøm et al., 2015). DANIDA has been fostering this attitude through the Diaspora Program, specifically targeted to the Somali and Afghan communities. To be eligible, candidates must legally register an association whose members are mostly Somali. Projects must always have a local partner. But up to 2015 it had only granted 1.1 million euros to a total of 25 projects (Danstrøm et al., 2015). The scarcity of funding has considerably limited the size and scope of the Danish-Somali NGOs. Some of them are no more than an empty shell, formally registered but actually inactive. They are usually created with the aim of carrying out a single project and very rarely grow beyond the scope of their original initiative. Only a few are organized on a professional basis. The majority are run by a very small group of volunteers. Being project-centered, they are involved in a great diversity of fields, ranging from health (Niil Naafo, Mental Health in Somalia), female genital mutilation (Foreningen mod Pigeomskæring), to education (Kaalmo–Denmark, Danish Somali Unity, Somalia Street Children), infrastructure (Ogaden Concern Association), economic development (Fairfishing, Aquashabelle), gender equality (Somali Women in Denmark) or culture (Viborg Somali Association).

Many were born as personal projects and are shaped by the particular biographies of their founders. Hiil Naafo was established in 1998 in Aarhus by a refugee who was crippled during the war. It supports the disabled in Mogadishu by sending them wheelchairs and medical equipment. FairFishing was co-founded in 2011 by two Somali, a Danish rear-admiral and a Danish fishery expert to rescue coastal people from piracy by promoting fishing activities.

Most interviewees expressed a moral obligation to support Somali NGOs in Denmark. However, involvement doesn’t usually go beyond paying the membership fee, which in most cases is just a donation. The small size of the contributions (they can be as less as 1 dollar per month) is another factor limiting the operational capacity of the associations. This might be simply a consequence of the low economic status of most Danish-Somalis and the prioritization of the moral obligations *vis-à-vis* relatives. However, other evidence leads to think that solidarity remains in many cases a merely theoretical stance. Low income people could contribute with voluntary work at the associations but only a small minority actually does it.

Most interviewees also showed a strong reluctance to go to Somalia to work on development, even if in a paid position. At most, they are disposed to travel back and forth, and even in those cases the majority envisaged this just as a possibility “in the future”. That is, only
theoretically. This attitude seems to be a consequence of the acculturation process. Presently, most Danish-Somalis have similar life aspirations (at least in material terms) than the Danish working-class population. They are aware they won’t be able to fulfill them in Somalia, unless they become part of the elite. Consequently, they perceive the devoting of time to charity work as getting in the way of improving their economic situation. For most of those who eventually travel to Somalia, the trip is lived as a dislocating experience that deepens their sense of disidentification with the country and, upon their return to Denmark their level of commitment might even weaken further. Similar experiences have been reported among other Scandinavian-Somali diasporas (Abdile & Pirkkalainen, 2011; Horst, 2018; Valentine et al., 2009). Horst (2018) found that the vast majority don’t stay in Somalia for longer than three years and, rather than considering this experience as a ‘return’ she thinks the process is better understood “in terms of a multi-sited and transnational sense of civic engagement and belonging” (Horst, 2018, p. 1348).

For those who are actively involved, significant differences between the first and second generation may have an impact in shaping the future landscape of Somali NGOs in Denmark. The majority of the existing organizations were founded and are still run by the first generation. Some of these people personally experienced the war and keep emotional scars that prevent them from trusting people from clans that were or still are enemies back in Somalia. This has frequently resulted in the creation of clan-based associations with projects targeted to beneficiaries hailing from their own clans (Kleist, 2008) and might explain the extreme level of fragmentation shown by NGOs in Denmark and other Scandinavian countries (Horst, 2018). In some cases, however, helping one’s own clan has more to do with practical and logistical reasons. When planning to develop a project in such a dangerous environment as Somalia, using the already available social network seems to be the best strategy to assure success. In any case, whether politically motivated or not, the clan-oriented nature of many NGOs hinders the efficacy of this track of diplomacy as a peacebuilding mechanism in several ways: 1) it has prevented the creation of bigger organizations with larger operational capacities. 2) in some cases, money earmarked for development might end up being used for clan politics rather than humanitarian purposes.

First generation Somalis frequently state an ulterior motive for joining an association: personal fulfillment, or even a paid job. Because first generation members have generally lower educational levels and proficiency in the Danish language participation in the humanitarian sector is one of the few available channels to escape unemployment and get social recognition within their own diaspora communities and the wider society in order to escape anomie.

For the second generation, on the other hand, clan identity is something they have only experienced as a narrative, not as a set of actually lived rules and practices. Their emotional and identity attachment to their parents’ clan is not only very weak but they lack knowledge and competence in the functioning of the clan system and the customary law. Their involvement in Track 4 activities is motivated by a sense of collective civic responsibility, a syncretic product of moral elements from both the Somali and Danish cultures. The communitarian values of the clan-based society they come from seem to have evolved into a more general sense of communitarianism that, unlike the original one, extends beyond clan boundaries.

Community is not something we have learnt from the Danish. It is something you absorb at home since you are a child, when you see every day that Somalis just don’t simply live for themselves, to satisfy their own needs, but they have obligations to the community (Danish-Somali man, 26).

This attitude merges with the civic values of a Danish culture shaped by decades of
social-democratic policies without any perceived contradiction. The result is the willingness of putting those values in practice by helping Somalia as a whole—and not a particular clan—evolve into a more peaceful and democratic society.

*Civic engagement is part of the Danish values we have been raised on. I value the importance of having one of the welfare systems and democratic states that best works in the world because I am a beneficiary of it. And because of that, I want the same for my parents’ country and want to contribute to building it* (female, 30).

This civic engagement is sometimes triggered not by a moral obligation in itself but by a need to counteract the negative effects stemming from the liminal situation that afflicts many individuals. Helping their fellow Somalis is a way to show them (and themselves) that they are still part of the greater Somali community. In practical terms, it forces them to keep in contact with their project counterparts and even travel to Somalia. At the same time, it is a way of gaining a positive visibility in Danish society, shaking off the negative stereotypes through which Somali refugees are seen by a part of the native population (as fundamentalists, practitioners of genital mutilation, school drop-outs, khat abusers or idle recipients of welfare benefits (Bundgaard, 2018)).

As the second generation progressively gains more clout in the ecosystem of Somali diaspora associations these are getting a more neutral stance. The trend will probably grow stronger in the future as the first generation is inevitably replaced by the second one.

**Track 5: Peacebuilding Through Knowledge Transfer**

Somalia’s education system was massively disrupted by the civil war. Most of the educational infrastructure was looted or re-functionalized by militias. For some years, education almost ceased to exist (Eno et al., 2015). A whole generation of idle and uneducated youth was more easily prone to recruitment by warring factions and indoctrination by jihadi groups. The lack of professionals in managerial positions and skilled workers seriously hindered the governance of society and the provision of modern basic services, dramatically increasing inequality and the anger and frustration of the population. Somalia currently depends on understaffed, uncoordinated and territorially limited foreign NGOs to barely provide those services. Knowledge transfer that restores and improves the native skilled labor force is thus a key peacebuilding action. Without native competent civil servants, enterprise managers, electricians, mechanics, engineers, nurses or doctors, Somalia will return to be a failed state.

The contribution of the diaspora to knowledge transfer is taking place in at least four ways:

1) *Out of individual personal initiatives.* In this sense, as already stated, the diaspora is playing a paramount role in the governance of the country and this also applies to the management of the most strategic parts of the private sector. The handful of big national enterprises already in operation are headed by diaspora CEOs (Omar, 2020).

2) *As part of projects run by NGOs headquartered in their host countries*

3) *Within the framework of more overarching national or international programs*[U1] like QUESTS (Qualified Expatriate Somali Technical Support), a joint venture of the Somali government, the UNDP and the International Organization for Migration that has placed hundreds of experts in governmental agencies (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2015). Unlike other Scandinavian countries (IOM, 2018) Denmark doesn’t participate in QUESTS but Danish-Somalis are welcome to join. A midwife at the University Hospital in Aarhus went to Hargeysa in 2018 under the Finnish QUEST-MIDA program to train local staff.
And diaspora organizations in Aarhus are financing similar activities under the DRC Diaspora Program (like the case of a psychiatrist who started a mental health center in Somaliland). The motivations driving highly-skilled diaspora Somalis to engage in knowledge-transfer activities are very similar to those of Track 4. As far as the profile of the Danish-Somalis engaged is concerned, our data point towards an overwhelming presence of second-generation individuals (education levels are much lower in the first generation). This has consequences in the kind of involvement, which is almost always of a short to middle-term nature. Skilled Danish-Somali rarely envisage to remain permanently. In spite of that, some of their specific traits can make a significant contribution to peacebuilding. Danish-Somalis may not have a spirit of entrepreneurship as developed as North American-Somalis, nor the strong clan and more traditional Muslim identity of the Gulf countries diaspora (which makes relations with the local Somalis culturally smoother) but they bring the Scandinavian culture of accountability to their professional practice.

In Denmark they teach us to be very precise and responsible in our work, because we are held accountable for what we do at all times. That means we must implement well-established evidence-based procedures to improve the quality of services (female, 28, participant in the MIDA FINNSOM program)

4) In the reconstruction of the educational system. Some returnees support local schools, providing financial, teaching and managerial assistance (Sheikh & Healy, 2009). They have been particularly active in rebuilding higher education. Prior to the war, the country had only two universities, both of them public albeit heavily dependent on foreign assistance. The Somali National University (SNU) had seven campuses across the country, funded by Italy. Italian, a language the vast majority of Somalis didn’t speak, was the main language of instruction. Lafoole University, funded by the U.S., used English as the medium of instruction (Cassanelli & Abdikadir, 2008). Both ceased to operate in 1990. The SNU reopened in 2014 but hasn’t recovered its pre-war size and the sector is now dominated by a plethora of private universities (Eno et al., 2015). Just as an illustration, Mogadishu University boasts almost as many students (5,779) as SNU had in 1990 (QS Top Universities, 2020). Although small and limited in resources these colleges are giving birth to an emergent educated middle class that is called to play a role in the long-term viability of the country. North American and British diaspora was quite active in the founding of some of them and many have diaspora members among their faculty and boards. Some are funded by diaspora money. We haven’t been able to find any evidence of Danish-Somalis participating in this process. A possible explanation lies again with the characteristics of this group: Danish-Somalis are a small group, not always proficient in English (now the teaching language in most of these institutions) and the percentage of them with university degrees is quite low. DANIDA, on the contrary, has funded Amoud University since 2003.

Track 6: Peacebuilding through Advocacy and Awareness-Raising

There is a culture of peace built within the fabric of Scandinavian and Danish societies, the product of decades of peace-oriented education delivered through different informal and academic programs and mainstream media. These values are also embedded in one of the more pervasive cultural structures: language. Danish lays a lot of emphasis on conveying politeness, humility and respect in any form of interaction (Fredsted, 2005; Levisen & Waters, 2015). Radicalism, violence of any kind (whether bullying at schools, gender-related, in sports, criminality or war) have been strongly banned from the cultural mainstream for more time than
any other modern societies. Even when violent acts are shown by the media, they are constructed as cautionary tales with a strong moral message. The result of this socialization process is a country with one of the highest levels of violence rejection and lowest levels of social conflict and criminality (Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2019). But, more importantly, this culture takes an institutional shape in the form of concrete policy instruments that aim at implementing peace in everyday life. Among them, we must highlight the SSP, an interdisciplinary collaboration between Schools, Social authorities, and Police aimed at crime prevention (Pedersen & Stothard, 2015) and a youth deradicalization program known as the Aarhus Model (Bertelsen, 2015, Hassan 2019).

Danish-Somalis are, consciously or unconsciously, carriers of these values and practices in their interactions with their fellow countrymen in Somalia, who, in contrast, are socialized amidst high levels of hatred and violence (clan, ethnic, religious, common criminality, intra-family, gender-based) which are quite often culturally/morally justified. The interaction of this violence-abhorring diaspora with native Somalis (whether through personal contact during return trips or increasingly via social media) generates thousands of micro-cultural clashes but, as suggested by some of our informants, it also seems to trigger processes of cultural transfer that help building a culture of tolerance in Somalia.

When I visit my relatives in Somalia I can’t believe why they are still so racist against the Bantu. They see them as if belonging to a different race but, frankly, coming from Europe you just see them as any other kind of black. Then I tell the people: don’t you understand that you are almost as black as them? that we are all the same, all Africans and human beings deserving the same things? When I say things like that I can see that sometimes I strike a chord, that people start looking at them in a different way, that they are thinking “maybe he is right, maybe there is no much of a difference after all” (female, 23)

Although this can be a two-way process, as it happens with the Islamic radicalization of some Danish-Somalis, the latter is a very small phenomenon, strongly frowned upon by the majority.

Many Danish-Somalis are not conscious of the impact their opinions and behaviors can have on native Somalis, but others definitely are and have even embarked in organized institutional awareness-raising campaigns. This is particularly the case of organizations which actively advocates against jihadi radicalization (like Unge4unge) or gender-based violence and FGM (female genital mutilation) (like the Somali Women of Denmark (SWOD)) both at home and in Somalia.

Here at Aarhus we have prevented some people from joining Al-Shabaab. There was the case of this girl... She had married an Australian Somali who then became a jihadist. She wanted to join him in Somalia. We worked for several weeks giving her counsel. We involved her family, her friends, we even made her talk to a guy who had defected... You can say we kind of brainwashed her into not doing it... (male, 24, member of Unge4unge).

We have a zero tolerance towards FGM and I think this belief has been strengthened by our life here in Denmark. We need to save girls who are in danger of circumcision because it is a real threat to their lives and their dignity. When I go to Somalia I constantly talk about this. Some people there even say “you are kind of obsessed, you preach all
the time”. I talk about it in social events with my family... I give talks at schools. Sometimes I even approach people on the streets. I talk to teenagers but also to their mothers and young men, because they are the future husbands and fathers, they are the ones who can break the loop. Less FGM is not only less violence and oppression towards women, is also less violence in general. If we teach our young men to treat women with respect, they will be more likely to treat other men with respect, too (female, 46, member of SWOD)

Track 7: Peacebuilding through Faith in Action

Radical Islamism is a very destructive force in Somalia but Islam can also have peacebuilding effects. A thick network of Muslim charities, created or founded by foreign governments, individual donors or associations driven by their religious duty of solidarity toward faithful co-religionists, contribute to provide basic services that help alleviate social unrest and keep the country running. Most mosques (sometimes headed by returnee imams) tend to promote a moderate version of Islam that counteracts the jihadi currents.

The most important exponent in this track is probably the Al-Islah movement, a splinter branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, many of whose leaders went in exile. Al-Islah has always been faithful to an agenda that rejects political violence and direct involvement in politics. They have gained a great deal of social and moral influence in Somalia thanks to their nationwide network of charities and their non-partisan stance and have tried to put it in practice as brokers of peace. They were present in all the major peace talks (Abdullahi, 2015).

There are some Al-Islah members among the Danish-Somali diaspora and we have collected evidence that mosques in Aarhus have engaged in some charity work in Somalia. Mosques have also been cooperating with the Aarhus de-radicalization programme (Bertelsen, 2015). But all in all, the contribution of Danish-Somali to peacebuilding through Track 7 is feeble. The reason lies again in the particular characteristics of the group. Their residential dispersion and loose practice of Islam (especially among the second generation) made them scarcely influential or active within the local mosques (which have a multinational composition) or Muslim organizations in Denmark. In spite of being the older Muslim community, today they only amount to 7.2% of the Danish Muslim population (Statistics Denmark, 2020). The Danish Islamic Council is controlled by the Arab community, with very strong links to some Gulf states, and has not distinguished itself for having a pacifist approach (Saudi Press Agency, 2015).

Track 8: Peacebuilding through Philanthropic Funding

There are no specific foundations dedicated to philanthropic funding among the Danish-Somali diaspora. Fundraising campaigns have been organized through the network of NGOs, in a more or less informal way, in the occasion of droughts and famines and at the time of Ethiopia's invasion in 2006. Beside these one-off activities, a more formal and continuous form of fundraising mechanism is implemented through the associations' membership fees but contributions are so small that the sums collected can barely have any impact back in Somalia.

Track 9: Peacebuilding through the Media

In 1991 television and radio stations ceased to operate in Somalia. Almost immediately the diaspora stepped in to fill that gap and opened Universal Television in London. However, it had little penetration in a country lacking a broadcasting infrastructure. Some local TV and
radio outlets would be born from the mid-2000s but by then the Internet had become the most widespread and influential media among Somalis. Today, despite the poverty and insecurity, over 70% of Somalis have access to the Internet, thanks mostly to diaspora investments (Elmi, 2019). With the hardware came a boom of websites and the intensive use of major social networks such as Facebook or Twitter. The diaspora played a fundamental role again. The first Somali websites were born in Canada, the US and the UK in the late 1990s. They combined news, discussion chats and user-generated content that contributed to the exchange of ideas and the shaping of public opinion. Most diaspora websites are run by young, IT-savvy non-partisan activists with an explicit agenda to overcome the clan and religious boundaries. They offer platforms in which Somali identity is discussed and reshaped in a more cosmopolitan fashion and they have inspired the opening of similar outlets in Somalia and among other diaspora communities (Chama, 2017; Elmi, 2019; Osman, 2017).

The Danish-Somali diaspora has not been an exception. In 2006 Unge4unge, an association of Somali youngsters from Aarhus, created a Facebook page and has been using it to prevent Somali youths from being radicalized. Unge4unge received the Aarhus Municipality's Integration Prize in 2008 and the Crime Prevention Award in 2009. In 2010, 13 Somali associations in Aarhus decided to digitally merge in a single platform, the AaruHuSomali website, to gain visibility and expand their reach. AaruHuSomali is an Internet outlet with a vocation to share the social activities and political opinions of Somalis in Aarhus with other Danish-Somali, the Danish society and Somalis back in the homeland. It is an information hub that shows the Danish-Somali as a community of law-abiding citizens who share the civic values of the host society. It has didactic functions that help reduce the stigmatization of Somalis within Danish society and trigger imitative behaviors in relatives and friends that follow the website back in Somalia.

In Somalia there is hate between clans, it is in their history and their culture. But here in Aarhus we have grown up in a different society. We are not part of that conflict. We are happy that we can be peaceful role models for people in Somalia (male, 22, collaborator of AarhuSomali)

Conclusions

The Somali diaspora underwent a process of social and cultural divergence triggered by their interaction with the different host societies. This diaspora can be classified into several macro-groups, the most significant of which are the African, the North American-British, the Arab countries, the Italian and the Scandinavian diaspora. Using the literature on Somali diasporas in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark and our own ethnographic data, the paper has given convincing evidence that allows to affirm that Danish-Somalis share a common set of traits with the rest of Scandinavian Somalis that distinguish them from other Somali diasporas. Namely: they constitute demographically small groups; they don’t count with people coming from the Somali economic and political elites among their ranks; they are on average a low-income group, heavily dependent on Welfare programs; they have undergone a rather intense process of acculturation into their host societies (they fluently speak the country’s language, live in ethnically mixed communities, convincingly adhere to the socialdemocratic values of the modern Scandinavian societies, practice a rather open and secularized version of Islam, present significant levels of individualist behavior and dissolution of their original clan structures and traditional patriarchal gender roles).

The Somali diaspora has engaged in a wide array of peacebuilding processes that have crucially contributed to rescuing Somalia from its dark days as a “failed state” and helped put the country on its current path towards stability and future normalization. This paper has given evidence proving that those peacebuilding roles vary in weight and nature among the different
diaspora groups and are contingent on their socioeconomic and cultural characteristics. As a consequence, if Danish-Somalis are sociologically quite similar to the rest of the Scandinavian diaspora, their peacebuilding activities had to be also quite similar in every aspect. Our research consistently shows that this is the case.

The absence of members of the Somali elite among the Scandinavian diaspora explains their absence in Somali politics (Track 1), still dominated by the old elites. On the other hand, the fact that Somalis were one of the oldest asylum-seekers groups in Denmark, made Somalia a priority country for Danish diplomacy, which explains the paramount role played by bodies like DANIDA in Track 1 (official diplomacy) and Track 2 (conflict resolution) programs and, through it, the role played by some diaspora members in those tracks. The socioeconomic status of Danish-Somalis as a low-income working class explains why they are almost absent from Track 8 activities (peacebuilding through philanthropic funding). Being mostly a group with low education levels and not generally fluent in English, their role is significantly limited in Track 5 (knowledge transfer) activities, too. Another idiosyncratic characteristic, this time of a cultural nature, such as their loose practice of Islam, makes them almost absent from Track 7 activities (peacebuilding through faith in action) since they are scarcely influential or active in their local mosques and Muslim organizations in Denmark. The characteristics of Somali diasporas in Scandinavia in general and in Denmark in particular also have an impact in the small size and limited scope of the Danish-Somali NGOs (track 4). NGOs are understaffed, can’t rely on members funding, and, very significantly can only count on the strong commitment of a small number of individuals. Danish-Somali, who are mostly working class, have similar life aspirations (in material terms) than the Danish working-class population and are in general more concerned with trying to fulfill their own goals that devoting their scarce savings, time or lives to helping their fellowmen in Somalia.

Danish Somalis are very active in Track 3 but only in the sending of remittances. The Scandinavian generous subsidy programs for asylum-seekers have revealed to be an obstacle for the formation of a class of diaspora entrepreneurs and thus, of peacebuilding via investment, as opposed to what happened in the US or Canada. On the other hand, the civic values instilled by the strong Welfare State may explain why Danish Somalis contribute with a higher amount of remittances per capita than other diaspora groups. These same values, and in particular the culture of peace built within the fabric of Scandinavian society, make them very active in Tracks 8 (awareness-raising) and 9 (the media, particularly the internet) since these are activities that don’t require having political or economical capital nor a full-time personal commitment to them. For, as we have mentioned above, they show great reluctance to involve in more demanding activities. In the case of Track 8 activities, our research has shown that many times it takes place through role-modelling and spontaneous interactions with people in Somalia of which the individuals are not even aware of.

Finally, the paper also shows that peacebuilding roles and their impacts also vary among generations within the same diaspora group. Our comparative analysis has also shown a relevant similarity between first- and second-generation Somalis in all the Scandinavian groups. First generation Danish-Somalis, although much more acculturated than their counterparts in other Somali diasporas, still keep rather strong solidarity ties to their clans, are less fluent in Danish and have lower education levels than the second generation. They are the founders and managers of most of the Danish-Somali NGOs, not only because of their age, but also because they are more committed with their motherland and due to their difficulties to otherwise find jobs with a relatively high managerial status in the Danish society (they see NGOs as a way to self-employment, upward social mobility, and self-esteem raising). As a result, Somali associations in Denmark and NGOs have so far tended to be organized along clan-based membership and to be oriented towards helping certain particular clans. The same can be said of first-generation remittances. In this regard, first-generation activities have had a two-ways
impact: some projects run by NGOs and some remittance money may have ended in the hands of clan elders and helped fuel the conflict. On the other hand, first generation’s clan solidarity has also had some positive peacebuilding effects: there is evidence of money used in the traditional way for settling disputes between members of different subclans and first-generation diaspora members have been crucial as mediators in inter-clan conflict resolution programs.

Second generation Danish-Somalis, on the other hand, show a different pattern of solidarity vis-à-vis their parents’ motherland. They rarely feel obliged to show loyalty or pay duty to the clans. Their remittances go to their closest relatives and they resent distant clansmen demands for help as a sort of harassment. When they engage in voluntary work in NGOs, whether in Denmark or Somalia, they do it out of a more cosmopolitan sense of civic engagement, very similar to that shown by native Danish volunteers. As they already represent 55% of the Danish-Somali diaspora, their pattern is already significantly changing the overall peacebuilding effect of this group. Remittances to clan elders have diminished. Danish-Somali media are mostly run by IT savvy young people and reflect their values rather than first generation ones. Awareness-raising is also mostly done by the younger generation, whether through social media or personal relations, in which the role played by young women (whose words and actions advocate for a new set of gender values and practices) stands out. As they progressively take over the older generation in the managing of the Danish-Somali associations and NGOs these will probably lose their clan-based nature and become truly Somali associations.

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